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holds; and (c) the concentration of British nationals in the three cardinal points of Shanghai, Tientsin and Canton, there to await developments indefinitely.
Sir M. Lampson rightly rules out the first alternative.
The second and third alternatives do not, I think, really cover the whole problem. Our policy is neither total abandonment, nor is it concentration in any specified places. We desire British nationals to stay and British interests to be maintained in all parts of China where they may safely remain. If they are in danger and we cannot defend them, they must evacuate. If they are not in danger, or if we are in a position to defend them in case of danger, then we desire that they should stay where they are. We have advised evacuation of British subjects from places up-country where they are either in danger or cannot be defended if they should fall into danger. But we have decided that with the means at our disposal there is one place and one place only which we are in a position to defend at any cost, and that is Shanghai, and one of the reasons why we decided to defend it any cost was that we were advised that evacua- tion was impracticable, we therefore had no alternative. We are not told that evacuation of Canton or Tientsin is impracticable, and we are, on the other hand, advised that we have not the forces available to defend Tientsin if it is heavily attacked. There is, therefore, no alternative but to evacuate if the lives of British subjects there are placed in danger. We have never said anything to justify the impression which both Sir M. Lampson and our people in China generally are here reported to have, that His Majesty's Government had decided to stand independently, if necessary, on the three vital centres of Shanghai, Tientsin and Canton. contrary, we have always made clear that, as far as Tientsin is concerned, it must be defended, if at all, by the Japanese.
On the
The limit of our policy of evacuation, which Sir M. Lampson asks us to define, is, therefore, that the one place which we will defend at any cost is Shanghai, but that this does not necessarily mean that we have decided to evacuate everything except Shanghai, and, still less, that we are prepared to announce to the world that this is our policy. We shall only evacuate as and when we are forced to and not sooner. We have placed upon Sir M. Lampson the responsibility of deciding when that moment has arrived as far as concerns Tientsin and Peking. It is a heavy responsibility and one which he is most reluctant to assume, but, things being as they are, he is the only person qualified to shoulder it, and he has therefore been given discretion to act without further reference home, lest there should be any unnecessary delay in case of urgent danger.
3. Sir M. Lampson asks whether he is right in presuming that His Majesty's Government are prepared to undertake the defence of both places and keep open communication between them if other Powers will co-operate.
The answer to this surely is that His Majesty's Government are prepared to furnish what forces they can provide, but only if the total forces provided by all the Powers is in their view adequate for the purpose for which it is designed. Our advisers say that two divisions would be required for the defence of Tientsin and its communications, that is to say, I take it, in order to make Tientsin a safe place to live in, and to allow of the evacuation of foreigners from Peking. This is a very large force, and the experience of Shanghai makes it most unlikely that it will be forthcoming.
4. Sir M. Lampson also asks to be sure that the decision to evacuate Tientsin for certain circumstances has not been decided on purely military grounds, but after full weight has been given to possible political and economic consequences.
The answer to this is that the decision has been taken on military considerations, which is, in fact, the only possible practical criterion upon which to decide the issue. However serious the political and economic consequences of evacuation may be, the fact remains that if we cannot by force make it safe for our nationals to stay they must evacuate. There is no alternative.
5. Sir M. Lampson fears a storm of protest among British interests in China, and thinks it unlikely that once we evacuate Tientsin we shall ever be able to re-establish our trade.
This may unfortunately be only too true, but there is no help for it.
6. He also asks us to consider whether independent evacuation of Tientsin would not play into the hands of our Japanese commercial rivals.
We do not, however, propose the independent evacuation of Tientsin. possible, of course, as was the case at Hankow, that the attack, if it comes at
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That can
Tientsin, may be directed first and exclusively against our concession. only be decided when the time comes. As things stand. however, it is most unlikely that our subjects in Tientsin, whatever the warning given them, will leave the city if they find that foreigners of other nationalities are prepared to stay.There is, therefore, hardly likely to be an independent evacuation of Tientsin. Even if it were announced that we could supply no forces for the defence of Tientsin, our announcement would probably not have a much more alarming effect upon our own nationals than upon other foreigners in the city, and the evacuation, if it then started, would probably be much more international than purely British.
7. Sir M. Lampson thinks it essential that the ground should be prepared by some governmental statement in England before any step is inaugurated by him.
This would surely be most unwise. It could only be done here in a public and ostentatious way and would create much unnecessary alarm. Advice given to British nationals and intimation given to foreign representatives by His Majesty's repre- sentative on the spot is surely in every way preferable to governmental declarations at a distance. Sir M. Lampson's responsibility is a heavy one, but not heavier than he will probably be called upon to sustain.
As regards Peking, two questions arise :—
(a) British nationals;
(b) The Legation.
As regards the first, Sir M. Lampson is taking the right course in advising British subjects to leave quietly.
As regards the Legation, he seems to be under some misapprehension. We have not urged upon him the immediate evacuation of the Legation nor have we urged upon him the independent withdrawal of the British Legation alone.
All we have done is to give full consideration to the very serious warning he sent us in his telegram No. 591; to tell him that if the worst comes to the worst we have no forces available alone to keep him safely in Peking and maintain his communications with the sea; and to tell him further that, therefore, if the worst does come to the worst he had better get away in time; and we have given him discretion to do so. The moment of evacuation we have left to him, and it seems hardly likely that he will think it necessary unless his colleagues also think it necessary; and that, What we therefore, the question of independent evacuation will hardly arise. especially want to avoid is another siege of the Legations and another expedition to rescue them.
There has now been a further development.
In his telegram No. 642 of the 8th April Sir M. Lampson reports
(1.) That the foreign commandants at Tientsin have advised that the strength of each foreign contingent should be at once doubled, and that the strength should be brought up to a total of 25,000 men as early as possible. (2.) That the five Ministers have agreed to recommend this strongly to their
governments. (3.) That he has informed his colleagues of the instructions contained in our telegram No. 237 about his being prepared for evacuation. This rather staggered them.
Sir M. Lampson finally urges that if we are prepared to contribute our quota we should take the question up with the least possible delay at other capitals.
This is clearly a question for the C.I.D.
Our quota will have to be at least a brigade, even if all the Powers contribute equally, and I doubt whether we shall be able to come in to that extent unless our military advisers change their minds. The principal burden will have to be borne by Japan and the United States. Everything depends on their attitude.
(Signed) W. STRANG. April 9, 1927.
This memorandum by Mr. Strang, and the draft telegram based thereon which is submitted herewith have been drawn up on the assumption that His Majesty's Government have definitely decided that with their commitments at Shanghai they have and will have no sufficient forces available for despatch to Tientsin or Peking in such numbers as to assure the security of those cities and the line of communication between them; as also that they could not even provide their quota of the 25,000 men now asked for by the local military advisers for that purpose.
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